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OPINION EVIDENCE OF INSANITY-CRIMINAL
CASES
Criminal responsibility reposes on the possession of
a certain amount of intelligence. Whether, at the time
of the commission of the alleged crime, the accused had
this amount of intelligencee, is one of the facts of which,
if disputed by the defendant there must be evidtnce. The
opinions of persons concernting this fact, are one of the
instruments by which the jury may bt convinced of the absence, or the presence of insanity.
OPINIONS OF NON-EXPERTS

Non-expert persons, who have had knowledge of the
prisontr may have and as witnesses may express opinions,
concerning his sanity. The question by which the opinion may be elicited, put by the commonwealth, may be
-whether the witness saw anything to lead him to think
the prisoner insane. It was contended that the word insane designated a higher degree of mental alienation than
was necessary in order to exculpa;te.
Mercur, J., conceding that it would be better to use the expression of
sound or unsound mind, thinks the question unexceptionable
since the witness' understanding of what constitutes insanity, as well as of what is unsoundness of mind, can be
discovered by cross-examination.'
'Pannell v. Comm., 86 Pa. 260.
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NON-EXPERTS MUST PROVE FACTS

The principle is general that non-expert witnesses, except subscribing witnesses, dn the probate of wills, must
testify to facts which, in the judgment of the trial judge,
warrant more or less cogently, the opinion concerning
insanity which they are expected to express, before they
can be properly questioned concerning that opinion. This
principle applies to criminal as well as to civil investigations. An opinion which, if valid at all, must be derived
from different facts from those stated, must be excluded.'
A witness details the conduct and language of the prisoner
just before the shooting, showing his opportunity of knowing the prisoner's mental condition. He may then testify
to the mental state of the latter.3 A non-expert who had
not seen the defendant for four months before the murder,
but who had seen him in epileptic attacks, and had stated
what his condition of mind was immediately after such
attacks, was not allowed to express an opinion whether
when the crime was committed, the prisoner was insane.
The facts described would not have warranted such an
opinion.'
INTERPRETATION OF THE BERAVIOR

Certain witnesses having testified to acts or behavior
of the prisoner, while in confinement, which were indicative of delusions or insanity, one who has been warden of a
penitentiary for a long time, may testify for the commonwealth, that prisoners very often feign insanity for the
purpose of securing their removal to hospitals, whence they
may effect escape, and thus deceive him and the physicians. This possibility that the acts supposed to reveal
delusion and insanity have been done merely for the purpose of misleading observers, in an important fact, and
tends to show that witnesses who testify to the prisoner's being under delusions, have been misled.' The testimony
2

Comm. v. Wireback, 190 Pa. 138.
v. Comm., 98 Pa. 322.
ONevling
4
Common. v. Buccieri, 153 Pa. 535.
aComm. v. Wireback, 190 Pa. 138.
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of two physicians that soon after the commission of the
crime, the defendant feigned unconsciousness, is admissible." When i is contended that the defendant has frequent attacks of epilepsy, causing him to fall to the ground,
and be in a stupor, and his mind to be disordered, the commonwealth may prove by witnesses, that, though living
near him, they never saw him have a fit, but often saw
him in a drunken stupor, in order that the jury may infer
that what is alleged to have been symptoms of epileptic insanity was only drunken prostration.'
NEGATION OF IMPRESSION OF INSANITY

A non-expert may describe his opportunities to observe the acused, on certain occasions, and, apparently,
without describing what acts or words he observed, say,
generally, that he saw, heard, nothing which would lead him
to believe that the prisoner was of unsound mind. W.
had killed his landlord L, who was requiring him to vacate
Witnesses,
the premises at the expiration of the term.
personal
aequaintestified
to
called for the prosecution,
tance with the defendant, to having seen him, to having
transacted business with him a short time before the homicide.
They stated their opportunities for observation.
The court then permitted this question: "From -the conversation you had with the prisoner at the time you 6tated,
and from your observation of his conduct, manner and
appearance (which apparently, had not been described) did
you or did you not discover anything that would lead you
to believe he was of unsound mind?" The answer was No.
Says Dean, J., "The witnesses were not asked to give their
opinion affirmaeely as to whether the defendant was of
souhd mind, for they had stated nothing to warrant said
opinion; but, whether they had noticed anything in his conduct or conversation irrational or indicating insanity at
the times they saw and talked with him, was clearly competent. The defendant alleged that he gave evidence of
cComm. v. Gearhardt, 205 Pa. 387.
7Comm. v. Buecieri, 153 Pa. 535.
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insanity for a period of eight months before the homicide:
the Commonwealth could answer it in no other way than
by calling those who had seen and conversed with him during the same time, to testify that they had noticed nothing
Dean, J., adds that
indicating unsoundness of mind."
though the defendant might well argue that this negative
evidence when compared with his affirmative testimony,
was the weaker, this was not an objeetion to its admissibility.8 In Comm. v. Gearhart 9 witnesses who say that they
saw nothing which indicated insanity, in the conduct of the
prisoner, are said not to give "opinions ;" a plainly inaccuThat undescribed conduct did not indirate statement.
cate insanity, is as much a matter of opinion, as that it did
A witindicate sanity, or that it did indicate insanity.
ness after te9ifying to conversations with the prisoner,
says that he did not discover anything in them which led
him t-o believe the prisoner insane. Cross-examined as to
whether, from all he had related, he discovered anything
on which he could base an opinion whether th e prisoner
was sane or insane, he replied as before that he saw nothing which led him to believe the prisoner insane. It is error, to prevent the defendant's putting the question. "Did.
you or did you not see enough in your intercourse with this
defendant to warrant you in expressing your opinion as to
his sanity or insanity, your attention not having been called
to the fact." Says Mercur, J., "Substantially the question
was whether he had scrutinized him with sufficient attention to form an intelligent opinion in regard to the conAn expert witness may likewise tesdition of his mind."'
tify to the non observation of anything that has induced
him to believe the prisoner to have -had an epileptic fit.
The defense of a homicide contending that he committed
the deed in a state of insanity following upon an attack of
epilepsy, a physician who saw him an hour after the crime
8

Comm. v. Wireback, 190 Pa. 138.

9205 Pa. 387; Comm. v. Marion, 232 Pa. 413. In Hall v. Comm.
22 W. N. 25, the physician saw no evidence of insanity.
1OPannell v. Commonwealth, 86 Pa. 260.
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was committed, noted his pulse, and made other observations, may be allowed to say that he saw no indication of a
recent epileptic convulsion; and that he did not think it
possible that a convulsion would have left no visible trace
of itself within two or three hours.'1
OBSERVATION BY EGPERTS
Experts who have made no observation of the prisoner, may express opinions, upon hypothetical questions,
whether the person described in them, would be insane, or
sane. But the expert may himself have seen, and examined the prisoner, and be thus able to apply his expert
knowledge directly to him, without hypothesis. Two medical witnesses had "known the prdsoner personally for several years." Their means of observing -himand of forming
an intelligent opinion as to the condition of 'his mind had
been most ample. "To their full observation as men,"
remarks Mercur, J., "they had applied their scientific
knowledge as experts, and testified to the results."
He
deprecates the disparagement of the value of such testimony.12 The physician of the hospital where the prisoner, having cut his own throat after 'the crime, is confined, and who has examined him, particularly with refence to insanity, may testify as a result, that tke prisoner
is sane."8
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS
Experts may testify to sanity or insanity of a
person, of whom certain things are true. He does not say
1"Comm. v. Buccieri, 153 Pa. 535. The witness may refer to the
testimony delivered by the prisoner before the jury, as indicating a

quality of memory inconsistent with his having frequent epileptic
fits. He said, "He an3wered questions so quickly and understood

them so thoroughly that I think his mind was not very much impaired
in a general way."
"2Pannell v. Comm., 86 Pa. 260.
'8 Hall v. Comm., 22 W. N. 25. It was held not improper to exclude a question to this witness why he examined with respect to insanity, unless there was some question in the hospital as to the insanity. The prevalence in the hospital of the opinion that the
prisoner was insane, would be an irrevelant fact.
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that they are true of the prisoner. It is for the jury to decide that. He asserts that if they are true of the prisoner,
or of any one, he is of unsound or of sound mind. The things
which he deems indicative of insanity it must be possible
for the jury to find legitimately to be true of the person on
trial; that is, there must be evidence from which they could
be properly inferred. The hypothetical question must embody facts upon which there is evidence, but the appellate
court is loath to reverse a trial judge for an alleged discrepancy between the facts assumed and the evidence."4 A phpsician or other expert, may testify to an,opinion founded on
the hypothesis that the testimony of one specified witnessor of designated witnesses, who are not inconsistent with
each other, is true." When there is evidence of a number
of facts which are relied on by the defense to show insanity,
these facts may by the commonwealth be stated to an expert,
one by one, and his opinion may be asked, whether each one,
If the deapart from the other, would indicate insanity."
the
facts,
and
not the
fense thinks that the coexistence of all
facts severally, reveals insanity, it may cross-question the
A
witness for his opinion founded on their coexistence.
striking instanoe is found in Coyle v. Commonwealth, where
an expert was asked by the commonwealth whether playing
marbles with boys on two occasions would show insanity;
whether the prisoner's offering to sell his father's place for
a summer resort would show it; whether his property
marriage, in a jocular way, to four women, would show it;
whether, having stolen a boat belonging to X, he had fled
from X, who threatened to punish him, into a house saying
that X was going to kill him, would show it; whether offering to two ladies, a ride on a bridleless horse, which offer they accepted, would show it- whether, being employed
in hauling wood away, he 'by neglecb lost a load each morning, and was on that account discharged, would show it;
whether, being scolded by his father on one occasion for not
'Comm. v. Wireback, 190 Pa. 138.
20Pannell v. Comm., 86 Pa. 260; Comm. v. Wireback, 190 Pa. 138.
1SCoyle v. Comm., 104 Pa. 117.
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returning sooner from a neighboring town to which he had
gone, -hecalled his father an old son-of-a4bitch, would show
it; etc. No error was found in this method of examination.
In Nevling v. Commonwealth, 7 the prisoner was on trial -for
fatally shooting another. Questions, styled hypothetical by
Green, J., were addressed to two persons who were not exJustifying their exclusion,
They were excluded.
perts.
Green, J., says they did not relate to -thecondition of the
prisoner at the time of the shooting, or immediately before
or after it. They assumed a state of facts which was disputed. They were intended to elicit an opinion whether the
prisoner was generally sane or insane when 'he was intoxicated, the answer to which could not prove anything as to
his mental condition at the shooting. The witnesses however, were permitted to testify, and did testify to facts within their knowledge as to his conduct and declarations when
he was intoxicated. Not having seen him on the day of the
shooting, they did not know that he was then fntoxicated.s
CAUSES

OF INSANITY

An expert was not allowed to answer the question, in a
homicide case, "what do you consider some of the commonest and most frequent causes, buth of epilepsy and insanity. 1 9 If the prisoner's counsel in opening the case to the
jury refers to concussion of the brain from the discharge of
a gun, as one of the causes of his alleged mental disturbance,
the commonwealth may ask an expert, a physician, whether
shock or concussion of the brain would be occasioned by the
discharge of a gun in a designated way, for the purpose of
obtaining a negative answer.2 0
1798 Pa. 822.
2But, if a man uniformly does acts after he has taken liquor
which indicate insanity, why cannot this fact be proved by those who

knew it in order that the jury may infer that, having imbibed on the
of the shooting, he was then insane?
occasion
29Hall v. Comm. 22 W. N. 25.
20
Coyle v. Comm., 104 Pa. 117.
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MOOT COURT
SPLANE'S APPEAL
Assignment by a Corporation for the Benefit of Creditors-Right of a
Stockholder and Officer Who Has Bought Claims Against the
Corporation Below Par to Share Pari Passu With Other Creditors
-Pennsylvania Rule Compared and Criticised
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Splane was a stockholder, a director, and the treasurer of Corporation X, which, unable to pay its debts, made an assignment of all
its property for the benefit of creditors. Six months later, Splane
bought with his own money debts owed by the corporation, the par
The
value of which was $1800; but for which he paid only $1200.
property of the corporation being sold, Splane claimed adividendalong
with other creditors on $1800. The auditor refused to allow any, but
said that if he was entitled to share in the fund, it could only be to
the extent of a dividend on $1200. Exceptions by Splane.
Courtney for appellant.
Kraus for appellee.
OPINION OF THE COURT
KELLER, J. The question here is whether a stockholder, who is
also a director and the treasurer, can, six months after the assignment for the benefit of creditors, buy up claims against the insolvent
corporation below par, and share "pari passu" with the other creditors in the distribution. If so, is he entitled to a dividend on the cost
price or on the face value of the claims?
Had Splane purchased the claims before the assignment, we should
find no difficulty in affirming the auditor on the authority of Hill v.
Frazier, 22 Pa. 320; and Germantown Pass. Ry. Co. v. Fitler, 60 Pa.
124. But the case at bar is different because in Hill v. Frazier insolvency and assignment had not intervened; in Germantown Pass. Ry.
Co. v. Fitler a voluntary assignment had been made but the assets
were not turned over to the assignee and the officers continued to
carry on the business as before.
In the case at bar, all the property and assets with the control
over same had passed to the assignee before Splane purchased any
claims. When an insolvent corporation has made an assignment for
the benefit of creditors, upon acceptance by the assignee, the relations
of its officers to it are "effectually dissolved by operation of law."
Hammond's Appeal, 123 Pa. 503 (1888); Law v. Waldron, 230 Pa.
458 (1911); 34 Cyc. 267; 21 L. R. A. 146.
The powers and duties of officers of a corporation, as such, cease
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when an assignment is made by the corporation for the benefit of
creditors, and such parties being no longer agents or trustees of the
corporation after such assignment, may purchase outstanding claims
against the corporation and may participate in the corporate assets on
such claims, according to their face value, along with other creditors.
Craig's Appeal, 92 Pa. 396.
In Craig's Appeal, A, the vice-president and B, a director, were
stockholders of an insolvent bank. After the assignment for the benefit of creditors, A and B purchased claims of depositors at 50 per
cent. Held, A and B were no longer officers of the bank and were
entitled to a pro rata dividend on these claims.
In Hammond's Appeal, supra, the corporation unable to pay its
debts, made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. Hammond, a
stockholder, was also a director and the treasurer of the corporation.
After the assignment he bought up debts of the corporation with his
own money at a discount varying from 50 per cent to a less percentaje. Held, Hammond was entitled to a dividend on the face value of
his claims. Neither the corporation or its stockholders have any reason to complain; the assets are not diminished or the liabilities increased.
We find as a fact that Splane was not guilty of fraud in buying
up these claims. Yet we think it opens the door to wild speculation
and fraud to permit a person to make profit by reason of inside knowledge obtained while in a fiduciary relationship with the corporation.
We think a safer and more equitable rule is announced in Moulton v.
Connell, 93 Tenn. 377 (1894); viz., where a company has assigned,
and its directors have bought claims at a discount, a suit to compel
them to turn in the claims at cost should be instituted by the as'signee. We think the Tennessee rule is the public policy view; and
it finds support in Buckley v. Whitcomb, 121 N. Y. 107 (1890), where
the court held that a stockholder who is also a director cannot buy
up claims against the insolvent company and offset them at their
face value. See also Duncomb v. R. R. Co., 84 N. Y. 190.
However we are bound by the Pennsylvania decisions and on the
authority of Hammond's Appeal, supra, which is directly in point,
and Craig's Appeal, supra, we concede that Splane is entitled to a
pro rata dividend on the face value of his claims, $1800.
We therefore reverse th auditor and order judgment in accordance with this opinion.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The competition, in this distribution, is between creditors only;
those who retained their claims against the corporation and Splane
who had bought the claims of other creditors at a discount of 33 per
cent.
If Splane made an improper use of his knowledge of the affairs
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of the corporation, of its debts, and its assets, not the other creditors
vho did not sell, but only those who did sell their claims to him, can
complain. Why, from any fraud practiced on the latter, should the
former reap any benefit? We fail to see a sufficient reason.
Nor can we see that when Splane bought the debts on which he
is now claiming, he acted as a trustee for the creditors. He was no
longer treasurer. He had no funds of the corporation. He owed no
duty towards anybody to buy up at a discount, any claims. Why, then
like any other person could he not with his own money, buy claims
and then, in the place of the original creditors, obtain on them, what
these original creditors could have obtained?
The cases cited in the opinion of the learned court below sufficiently sustain its decision. Appeal dismissed.

BROADHEAD v. ENNIS
Action Against Vendor of Real Estate After Conveyance to Recover
Part of Purchase Money Because of Deficiency in Quantity-Representations by Agent Without Express Authority
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ennis employed Hoke to sell for him a piece of land fixing the
price at $7000. Hoke, believing that the track contained 29 acres so
represented it to Broadhead, who stated he would not buy it if it contained less. Hoke had not express authority to make any representations concerning the acreage. After the conveyance Broadhead discovered that the tract contained only 20 acres. He sues to recover
the difference between what would have been its value had it contained 29 acres and its actual value.
Plesset for the plaintiff.
Courtney for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
CLASTER, J. The facts as stated shed no light as to the plaintiff's form of action,-neither has the counsel for the plaintiff intimated what form he has brought. Let us assume that the action is one in
assumpsit, because it was brought to recover money paid to the defendant, as part of the consideration for a deed of land which proved deficient in quantity.
The question is whether or not the defendant is required to make
good the difference, where the conveyance has been fully executed by
payment of the purchase money and acceptance of the deed, and
where the plaintiff still retains the title and does not offer to rescind
by reconveying the property and placing the parties in statu quo.
It must be admitted that there was no fraudulent misrepresenta-
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tion made by the defendant or by any one for whom he may be responsible. In Kerr v. Kitchen, 7 Pa. 486, it was held that a vendee of land may DEFEND an action brought for the purchase money by
showing existing incumbrances or defects of title, he can not on these
grounds recover back the consideration money paid, after conveyance
made unless there be FRAUD or WARRANT.
In that case the
plaintiff concedes this doctrine and bases his claim to recover the
ground rents and taxes paid by him on an imputed fraudulent concealment by the defendant. But the court held that there was not the
slightest foundation for this pretense, because the plaintiff had constructive notice of all that was necessary for him to know. He had
recourse to the registry. If the court in the above case came to the
reasonable conclusion that there was no fraud in that transaction,
surely the case at bar has no evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation. Here too, the deeds were surely open to inspection of all the
parties, and the plaintiff had constructive notice of all that was necessary for him to know, and with the exercise of ordinary precaution, he might have seen that there were not twenty-nine acres.
The sale here was not a sale of land by the ACRE, but a sale in
GROSS. The quantity was not referred to in the contracts, and the
purchase price was not determined by the number of ACRES the tract
contained. An explanation of this distinction is to be found in Baker
v. Barley, 34 Superior 169, where the court said that "altho the land
was represented to the vendee as containing thirty acres yet the real
contract was to convey the farm for a certain price, and this contract
was executed by the drawing up and delivery of the deeds and mortgages. The defendant conveyed the land that she agreed to convey
and there is no material discrepancy between the actual quantity of
land and the quantity claimed in the deed." In other words on the
face of the contract in question, the number of acres to be sold was
not the essence thereof, but simply descriptive.
It is impossible to find anything more in the case at bar than a
mistake which was mutual, with equal opportunities for both to correct it before closing the deal. That this is not enough to open the
contract and let either party in upon the other for redress AFTER
the deed is delivered and bond given for purchase money, has been
many times decided and is undoubted law in this state. Rogers v.
Qlshoffsky, 110 Pa. 147.
In the case of Large v. Penn, 6 S. & R. 488, it was held that "it is
the boundaries to which the grantee must look; he has the right to all
the land within them. The quantity is a mere matter of speculation,
and be it more or less it passes. There is no EXPRESS covenant that
the quantity shall contain two and three fourth acres. Nor is there
any implied covenant; because the quantity is introduced not by way
cf covenant but by way of description." The actual quantity was one
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acre and one hundred forty eight perches, and yet the vendee was denied relief.
We reiterate our former statement that in this case there was no
fraudulent misrepresentations made by the agent of the defendant, because the very essence of fraud, the want of honest belief, is entirely
lacking here. But even for the sake of argument, assuming that there
might have been fraud on the part of the agent, we are next brought
to the question whether such fraud could be imputed to the principal.
It seems that the Pennsylvania rule on this question is out of line
with that of other states. 31 Cyc. 1583. .The courts of this state
seem to restrict the liability of the principal in an action for deceit to
cases in which the principal had actual knowledge of the agent's
fraud, or where he specially authorized or participated in it. In an
action of deceit for fraud in the sale of lands to the plaintiff by the
defendant's agent, it was held that such action could not be maintained
where the evidence fails to show that the PRINCIPAL PARTICIPATED in or KNEW or OUGHT TO HAVE KNOWN of such fraud. The
SCIENTER of the DEFENDANT PRINCIPAL must not only be alleged but proved. Keefe v. Scholl, 181 Pa. 90; Freyer v. McCord, 165
Pa. 539. In an action of deceit by a vendee against a vendor to recover damages for misrepresentations made by the VENDOR'S
AGENT as to the QUANTITY of the land conveyed, the action was
not sustained, because it appeared that the vendor authorized the
agent to sell only the lands described in the deed and no more, and
that the vendor had no personal communication with the vendee. 36
Weekly Notes 75; 42 Pittsburg Law Journal 423. In the light ofthis settled law we fail to see, how even had- there been fraud on the part of
the agent, the plaintiff in the case at bar could maintain an action of
trespass for deceit against the principal.
Where the purchase money has been paid, and the title proves defective the vendee in the absence of fraud can recover it back only
upon the covenants in his deed. If the deed contains no apt covenants for that purpose he has no remedy. Fiske v. Duncan, 83 Pa.
196; Steinhauer v. Whitman, 1 S. & R. 438; Kerr v. Kitchen, supra.
In the present case there was no warranty in the deed and we can not
understand how the plaintiff can recover for that for which he did not
expressly covenant.
If the plaintiff bases his right to recover on the ground of mutual
mistake, his remedy was to tender a reconveyance and sue for the recission of the contract. Equity will relieve in such a case because the
mistake of the parties was so essential and substantial that it may
reasonably be supposed that, but for the misdescription they might
not have entered into the contract at all. Babcock v. Day, 104 Pa. 4.
Under the facts of this case if the injury had been but small, as
compared with the consideration we might hold the defendant without
remedy, but the magnitude of the injury is such that the defendant
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should obtain relief in some form. He must not however hold to the
profits of his contract and demand compensation for his loss. He
should put the plaintiff in statuo quo, tender a reconveyance, and demand and sue for a recission.
As this is an action for damages under the contract we are not
bound to consider what the plaintiff's relief would be had he gone intc equity.
We therefore conclude that there was no actual fraud on the part
of the defendant, or his agent, but even if there were in the case of
the latter, still the defendant would not be liable under the Pennsylvania law in an action for deceit.
Nor can he recover part of the
money paid to the defendant in an action of assumpsit because he
can not hold to the profits of his contract and demand compensation
for his loss.
Compulsory non-suit entered against the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The learned court below has decided that whether the present
proceeding is an action of trespass or an action of assumpsit, the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover the difference between the actual
value of the land and the value the land would have if it contained
twenty-nine acres. This decision is justified by the authorities.
The plaintiff cannot recover if the action is an action of trespass. It is true that, tho there is a conflict of authority, the rule in
the majority jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, is that a fraudulent representation by the vendor as to area of land within boundaries which are correctly pointed out is actionable. (See 23 L. R. A.
N. S. 487). But in this case there was no fraudulent representation
by the vendor.
Tho it is difficult to believe that Justice Mitchell did not mean
to assert in Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353, that a principal may be
liable in a civil action for the deceit of his agent tho it was practiced
without his knowledge or participation and contrary to his orders, we
must accept his statement in Freyer v. McCord, 165 Pa. 539, that
such was not his intention. In this case it is held that the action of
deceit being founded on fraud or moral wrong, to sustain it against
a principal on representations made by an agent there should be some
evidence of participation or knowledge on the part of the principal or,
at least, proof of circumstances which should have put him on inquiry. This decision announces a rule contrary to that announced in
Erie Iron Works v. Barber, 106 Pa. 125, and to that prevailing in
many other jurisdictions, but it was followed and approved in Keefe
v. Sholl, 180 Pa. 90, and must be accepted as the law of Pennsylvania. In this case there was no proof of knowledge or participation
on the part of the principal.
The plaintiff cannot recover if the action is an action of assumpsit. To hold otherwise would be to make and enforce a contract
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which neither of the parties desired. Broadhead expressly stated
that he did not desire the land if it contained less than twenty-Dine
acres. Ennis had fixed the price at seven thousand dollars. To allow a recovery in this action would be to enforce a contract for the
sale of twenty acres of land for a price of approximately fifty-five
hundred dollars which would be contrary to the expressed desire of
both parties.
Under such circumstances 'we have no hesitation in applying the
rule which was announced in McCandless v. Young, 96 Pa. 289, that in
an action of assumpsit to recover back a portion of the purchase money
paid for a tract of land which the vendor represented as containing a
greater number of acres than it actually did, there can be no recovery
without proof that the vendor knew that the representation was false.
This doctrine is, we think, equally applicable to a case where the vendor did not know that the representation was made altho he knew
of the facts which rendered the representation false. Certainly it is
applicable to this case where there is no proof that the vendor knew
that the representation was made and no proof that he knew the facts
which rendered the representation false.
Our decision on this point is fortified by a number of cases in
which it is held that the acceptance of a deed precludes a purchaser
from claiming an allowance for a deficiency in the quantity of the
land where there has been no actual fraud or bad faith on the part
of the vendor. Rodgers v. Olshoffshy, 110 Pa. 147; Coughenous v.
Slauff, 77 Pa. 191.
Judgment affirmed.
STOCKBRIDGE v. FLYNN

Bill for Decree of Specific Performance Against Vendee on a Contract
for Purchase of Real Estate-Marketable Title-Presumption of
Death-Act of May 28, 1913, P. L. 370
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Land had belonged to Mrs. Harrison, who died a year ago leaving
as her only heir, Stockbridge. Her husband had deserted her twenty
five years before and gone to a western state. He corresponded with
his own brothers and sisters, until nine years ago when his letters
ceased. Flynn contracted to buy the land, provided a good title in
fee could be made. Suspecting that Harrison may still be alive--if
alive he would now be sixty years old-Flynn declines to accept the
conveyanice. This is a bill in equity to compel him to do so.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HIBBARD, J. A decree for specific performance is of grace
oand not of right. It will never be made in favor of a vendor, unless
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he is able to offer a title marketable beyond a reasonable doubt, nor
against a vendee where he is able to show any circumstances which
would make it unconscionable to do so. The rule of law is that to
be marketable a title must be good beyond a reasonable doubt. "It
has been well and wisely settled that under a contract for the sale
of real estate the vendee has the right, not merely to have conveyed
to him a good but an indubitable title. Only such a title is deemed
marketable, for otherwise the purchaser may be buying a lawsuit,
which will cause a very serious loss to him both in time and money,
even if he ultimately succeeds. Hence it has often been held that a
title is not marketable where it exposes the party holding it to litigation:" Swayne v. Lyon, 67 Pa. 436. In Holmes v. Woods, 168 Pa.
530: "A doubtful title or a title which exposes the holder of it to litigation is not marketable, and the rule in equity is that a purchaser
will not be compelled to accept it." "A vendee of real estate who is
entitled under his contract to receive a marketable title to the premises, is under no obligation to take a title which, even if it might be
finally determined to be good, is in a condition to involve him in litigation to establish or secure it." Srolovitz v. Margulis, 35 Pa. Super.
Ct. 252. "The question is not whether the title is good, but whether
it is clearly so;" Kostenbader v. Spotts, 80 Pa. 430. "A marketable
title means one that involves no considerable or rational doubt either
as to matter of law or fact:" Nicbl v. Carr, 35 Pa. 381; Stone v. Carter, 48 Super. Ct. 236; Christ Ref. Church v. Clark, 47 Super. Ct. 286;
Herman v. Somers, 158 Pa. 424; Speakman v. Forepaugh, 44 Pa. 363.
Does Stockbridge hold sufficient title to transfer to Flynn a marketable and indubitable title, free from any possibility of litigation,
and without limitaton as to extent? Harrison upon his return, if
not deprived by law, is entitled to curtesy in the estate. Two questions now arise: 1. Does the presumption of death of Harrison, 2.
or the operation of Act of May 4, 1855, P. L. 430 render the plaintiff's title marketable?
1. The presumption of death arising from the absence of the
person for seven years unheard from stands as competent proof until it is successfully rebutted by competent and satisfactory evidence
to the contrary: Thomas v. Thomas, 124 Pa. 646; Schoneman's Appeal, 174 Pa. 1; 1 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, 41; 1 Greenleaf on Ev.,
138. By Act of May 28, 1913, P. L. 370, Sec. 5: "Whenever the said
court shall enter a decree that the presumption of death of any person has been established * * * * the real estate of the person presumed to be dead shall pass and devolve as in case of actual death,
and the persons entitled by will or under the intestate laws may enter and take possession." The presumption of death has not, as yet,
been established according to Act of 1913; and until it is established,
the vendee cannot be compelled to accept the estate subject to litigation.
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2. The reasonable and lawful cause which will justify a husband in separating from his wife and refusing to contribute to her
support will prevent the Act of May 4, 1855, P. L. 430 from operating
to debar him, after her decease, from claiming his curtesy or his
rights under the intestate laws: Hayes' Estate, 23 Super. Ct. 570.
When desertion is shown, it is presumed to have been wilful and malicious, and the burden is upon the husband to show that he had
reasonable and lawful cause: Bealor v. Hahn, 117 Pa. 169.
We do not think that equity in the face of two presumptions, rebuttable at any time by competent evidence, will compel Flynn to accept the conveyance burdened with litigation, which at any time may
force him to enter a court of law to defend his title, even if it might
be finally determined to be good.
For the reasons pointed out the judgment should be for the defendant and the bill dismissed.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
This is a suit in equity for specific performance in which the
vendee denies the marketability of the vendor's title because there
is a possible curtesy interest in one who, if living, would be sixty
years old, but who, twenty five years ago, deserted his wife and went
to a western state.
The vendor insists that the title is marketable because (1) there
is a presumption that the husband is dead; (2) the husband by deserting his wife has forfeited his right to share in her estate.
It may be observed in limine that the facts upon which both assertions of the defendant are predicated, whether proved by witnesses
or admitted by both parties, are facts of which, previous to this case,
there has been no judicial determination which binds anyone, and
that the adjudication of these facts in the present case will not be
conclusive against the husband who is not a party. An adjudication
against the defendant will bind him but will not protect him.
It may be observed further that the facts upon which the assertions of the defendant are predicted depend for their proof entirely
upon oral testimony.
The case, therefore, must "be made very clear by the vendor to
warrant the court in ordering sepcific performance." 36 Cyc. 635.
Considering the case with regard to either or both of the vendor's propositions, the vendor has not made it "very dear."
The presumption of death does not arise unless the husband has
been unheard of as well as absent for more than seven years, nor
dogs it arise if the husband acquires a domicile in the western state.
There is no allegation that the husband has been unheard of for more
than seven years. It is simply alleged that for nine years, he has
not written to his brothers and sisters. There is nothing in the facts
as stated which is inconsistent with the acquisition by the husband
of a new domicile in the western state.
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Assuming, however, that facts sufficient to give rise to the presumption of death exist, the inquiry is whether such a strong probability of the husband's death is created by these facts as to render
the title of the plaintiff valid "beyond a reasonable doubt."
The important facts from which the presumption of death is
said to arise are (1) the fact that the husband has been absent for
twenty five years and, let us assume, unheard of for nine years; (2)
the fact that for sixteen years after his departure he corresponded
with his brothers and sisters and then, apparently without explanation his "letters ceased."
The probability of the husband's death to which these facts give
rise is not in our opinion, very great. Assuredly these facts do not
convince us beyond a reasonable doubt that the husband is dead. The
manner in which the husband terminated his relations with his fanily was unusual, but we know that, in case of men at least, such
termination is often caused by other reasons than death, and, in the
present case, the extraordinary aspect of these occurrences is much
modified by the fact that, apparently, no effort was made by his family to seek an explanation of the cessation of his letters.
There is, indeed, in the present case, an entire absence of those
facts, which tho not essential to have always been regarded as fortifying, the presumption of death. It does not appear that the husband was in a desperate condition of health or circumstances, or that
he was exposed to danger, or that he had property which rendered it
probable that he would return to care for it, or that inquiry was made
concerning him, or that his age if living would be unusual or extraordinary. In absence of such corroborate evidence, a title depending upon the presumption of death is unmarketable.
Vought v. Williams,
120 N. Y. 253; Chew v. Tome, 93 Md. 244; Cerf v. Diener, 210 N. Y.
156; 27 Harvard Law Review, 768; 21 Harvard LawReview,374.
In construing the act of 1855, it has been held that a reasonable
and lawful cause which will justify a husband in separating from his
wife and refusing to contribute to her support, will prevent the act
from operating to debar him, after her decease, from claiming curtesy. Hayes' Est., 23 Super. 570.
In the present case there is nothing to show that the husband did
not have such cause, and tho it has been held that there is a presumption that he did not, it has never been held that this presumption is
such as to preclude a reasonable doubt or that it may be disposed only
by evidence showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the husband had
good cause. That the husband may have had such cause in this case,
is not so improbable as to make the doubt as to the validity of the
vendor's title created by the assumption that such was the case, unreasonable.
Finally the remedy of the plaintiff, if he is entitled to any, is not
in equity but at law. Kaufman's Ap., 55 Pa. 383.
Decree dismissing bill affirmed.
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ROBINSON v. SHAW
Promissory Note-The Effect of an Agreement by Payee to Extend
Time of Payment Upon the Liabilities of an Accommodation Endorser-Section 120, Negotiable Instruments Act
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Exeter executed to Robinson a note for $500.00 payable in six
months, i. e. on August 19th, 1913. Shaw endorsed this note for Exeter's accommodation as Robinson knew. On November 16th, 1913,
Robinson agreed with Exeter to wait for payment until March 20th,
1914, if Exeter would pay interest in advance to that date. Exeter
paid about two thirds of the interest at once and agreed to pay the
rest in a few days. He never paid it. Robinson, however waited before suing until April 18th, 1914, when he sued Shaw the endorser.
Shaw's only defense is that he was discharged by the agreement to
extend the time of payment, to which he did not assent.
Claster for the plaintiff.
Massenger for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SHENTON, J. It is provided by Section 64 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act of 1901 that "where a person not otherwise a party
to an instrument, places thereon his signature in blank before delivery, he is liable as an endorser, etc." Such seems to have been
the state of the facts in the case at bar. As an endorser, Shaw's
liability was "secondary." In the same act, Section 120, which
seems to be declaratory of the pre-existing law of commercial paper in Pennsylvania and elsewhere, provides that one secondarily
liable is discharged in certain specified ways, the sixth being, "By
any agreement binding upon the holder to extend the time of payment, or to postpone the holder's right to enforce the instrument,
unless made with the consent of the party secondarily liable, or unless the right of recourse is expressly reserved." The special verdict which comes to us for consideration does not show that plaintiff reserved the right of recourse against the defendant, and it is
admitted that the defendant never assented to the extension granted
to Exeter, the maker. Whether the plaintiff's promise to postpone
his right to enforce the note became binding upon him is therefore
the chief point of law to be decided.
We think that Robinson effectually bound himself, and that
though as a matter of fact he did not attempt to enforce payment
prior to the expiration of the extended time, yet if he had attempted to do so he would have failed. Counsel for the plaintiff argues
that payment of the interest, all of it, in advance to March 20, 1914,
was a condition precedent to the validity of the contract, and that
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payment of the two thirds was a failure to *perform which nullified
the agreement so far as binding the plaintiff is concerned. It certainly is fair -to assume that such was the intention of the parties;
and we should not hesitate to give the understanding a corresponding legal effect were it not for the subsequent acts of the plaintiff
which we believe must be fatal to his contention. Tender of two
thirds of the advance interest with a promise of the other third in
a few days was not such offer of performance as the plaintiff was
bound to accept, and he would have acted within his rights had he
refused to accept. But he did accept, and we cannot avoid the conclusion that he waived, and intended to waive, performance of the
condition precedent, and that he substituted legally, and intended
to substitute actually, a new consideration for his promise. At the
expiration of the "few days" an action accrued to him for the unpaid
one third, but he must be held to have estopped himself from rescinding the agreement. He finds himself in possession of money
his right to which cannot be explained except on the ground that it
represents consideration for a promise made by him.
He cannot
keep tightly clasped in one hand money which he would not have
but for reliance on his promise, while with the other hand he presents to the court his petition the prayer of which is that he be
not bound by the promise.
This solution of the question seems so simple and inevitable that
we deem it almost unnecessary to advert to authority to support the
formal legal principles involved. Cases in accord may be found in
all jurisdictions. Perhaps the doctrine, cannot be better put than in
Wiley v. Inhabitants of Athol 150 Mass. 426: "Although conditions
precedent must be performed and partial performance is not sufficient, yet when a contract has been performed in a substantial part
and the other party has voluntarily received and accepted the benefit of the part performance, knowing that the contract was not fully
performed, the latter may be thereby precluded from relying on the
performance of the residue as a condition precedent to his liability
to pay for what he has received, and may be comipelled to rely upon
his claim for damages in respect of the defective performance." To
the same effect are Fessler v. Love, 43 Pa, 313; Shaw v. Badger,
12 S. & R. 275; French v. Lewis, 32 Sup. CL. (Pa.) 279; Phillips, etc.
v. Seymour, 91 U. S. 646; Young Bros. Machine Co. v. Young, 111
Mich. 118; Bechtel v. Cone, 52 Md. 698.
It is conceivable that the "payment in advance" contemplated
by the parties did not of necessity have to be made on the day the
agreement was struck, and that it might reasonably have been intended to be made within the "few days." In that case the acceptance of the two thirds might not be conclusive on the question
of waiver. But the case is not complicated by a single act of the
.plaintiff which would indicate rescission, such as for example,
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might be considered a tender of the advanced interest back to Exeter
when the "few days" had elapsed. Even the institution of this suit
is no evidence of such rescission, coming as it does after the date to
which payment was extended. There should have been at least an
attempt to rescind if waiver was to be avoided. Frech v. Lewis,
32 Pa. Sup. 279; Burk v. Bowen, 13 Pa. 146; Walls v. Janeiro, 13
Dickinson Law Review, 195.
Counsel for the plaintiff makes mathematical calculations and
finds that the two thirds of the interest advanced was in fact less
than was already due from the execution of the note to November
16, 1913. He relies upon this to show a failure of consideration in
the agreement to extend. But the money was clearly intended to
be applied as advance interest, and the plaintiff had no right to apply it to the payment of any other obligation. Martin v. Draher,
5 Watts 544; Selbridge v. Northampton Bank, 8 W. & S., 320; Smuller v. Union Canal Co., 37 Pa. 68.
One more contention of the plaintiff must be passed upon. The
agreement to extend was made after maturity of the note. Plaintiff claims that since the defendant has not set up want of notice
of dishonor as a defense, it must be presumed that he had notice or
waived it, and that his liability is thereby fixed and cannot be changed by an agreement to extend even though the agreement be binding. He cites no authority. Probably there is none in Pennsylvania. "Some courts have held that the endorser is not discharged if
his liability has become fixed by demand, protest, and notice of dishonor, but the weight of authority is to the contrary." 7 Cyc. 885.
(No Pennsylvania case cited pro or con). This court has searched
assiduously for cases in Pennsylvania, in which might lurk the doctrine relied upon, but is forced to conclude that it is not law. Sterling v. Marietta, etc.. 11 S. & R. 79, declares: ,'If the original time
of payment had been enlarged without the consent of the endorsers,
they would have been discharged. But money having been demanded, and the note protested, and notice given to the endorsers,
they are fixed and the holder of the note may delay as long as he
pleases without injuring his security." But the delay was mere forbearance not based on any consideration which made it binding. In
National Bank v. Diehl, 218 Pa. 588, time was granted after maturity, though not to the maker, but the court in giving the reason for
not releasing the endorser shows that the distinction sought to be
drawn between cases where the extension is granted before maturity and those where it is granted after, is without valid foundation.
"We quite agree," says the Supreme Court, "that the agreement
did not contain any provision whereby the bank precluded itself from
proceeding at any -time to collect from the maker, or from accepting payment from any of the endorsers, and immediately thereupon
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delivering the note for suit or any other process desired." The fact
that when the holder binds himself he also binds an endorser who by
paying the note would be subrogated to his rights, and no more than
his rights, a situation which might easily prejudice the endorser, is
thus seen to the controlling reason for the rule. The reason applies in our judgment just as forcibly after protest as before, so
that there seems to be no justification for a distinction.
Accordingly we think the law is with the defendant, and are
confident furthermore that the application of the legal principles
herein set forth does no violence to the actual intentions of the parties.
Judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The able opinion of the learned court below makes an extended
discussion of this case unnecessary.
By Shaw's endorsement, he made himself liable to the payee of
the note, Robinson.
Proper steps having been taken at the maturity of the note to complete the liability of Shaw, viz by demand of payment from Exeter
and prompt notice of his failure to pay to Shaw, Shaw became unconditionally liable to pay the note. He remained however, still
secondarily liable, and an agreement to which he did not assent.
and which did not reserve to Robinson the right to proceed at once
against Exeter, discharged him. Manufacturers' & Mechanics' Bank
v. Bank of Pennsylvania, 7 W. & S. 335.
Was an agreement between Robinson and Exeter to extend
time to the latter, made? The special verdict finds that it was.
"Robinson agreed with Exeter to wait for payment until March
20th, 1914, if Exeter would pay interest in advance to that date."
Exeter did not pay more than two thirds of the interest to that
date, but "agreed to pay the rest in a few days;" that is, Robinson
agreed to wait a few days for the completion of the payment. It
ic not necessary to find, as the learned court below has found, that
Robinson thus tied his hands until March 20th, 1914. It is enough
that he tied his hands at least for a few days from Nov. 16th,
1913. A binding agreement to wait even for a short time, will have
the same effect as one to wait for a long time. When Robinson
received the money as two-thirds of the interest, and agreed to wait
for the rest a few days, he agreed not to sue until the expiration of
those days. In Manufacturers' Bank v. Bank of Pennsylvania supra
the creditor's agreement was to wait a year from Oct. 13th, 1841, if
the debtor would on the 3d Nov., 1841, pay the whole interest accruing during the year. The interest was not paid on Nov. 3d or
at any time; but for the three weeks between Oct. 13th and Nov.
3d, the creditor had precluded himself from xuing. Hence the en-
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dorser was discharged although a judgment had been previously recovered against him.
Shaw was not a party to the agreement for an extension of
time; nor did Robinson reserve the right to pursue Shaw at any
time. Hence, for reasons variously given by the courts and few of
which are satisfactory, Shaw was discharged. This case differs
from Bank of York v. Webster, 242 Pa. 128, in that there there was no
proof of an agreement to extend time. The data furnished did not
warrant the inference that such an agreement had been made.
The judgment of the court below is therefore affirmed.

SARAH COLLINS v. WEBB
Ejectment-Resulting Trusts of Real Estate Where Conveyance is
Made in Name of One Person and Part of the Consideration is
Paid by Another-Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 425.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Collins obtained a conveyance of land. Webb subsequently obtained a judgment against him on which the land was levied on
and sold as John's, Webb becoming the purchaser and obtaining
possession. Sarah Collins, sister of John, proves that before John's
purchase, it was agreed between him and her that if she would pay
the vendor part of the purchase money she should be the owner of
a corresponding part. The price of the land was $4000 and she paid
$2125 of it. She seeks in the ejectment to recover 425-800 of the
land. Webb was aware of her claim, not when he obtained his judgment but before he became the purchaser at the sheriff's sale.
Burns for the plaintiff.
McKeown for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BASHORE, J. From the facts above stated it is clear that a
resulting trust is created for where the purchase money of land is
paid by one and the title taken in the name of another, there is a
resulting trust which the law implies in favor of him who pays the
money. The mere fact that the land was paid for with the money
of the claimant is sufficient to establish, prima facie, a trust in his
favor and in such cases it is error to apply the rule requiring parol
contracts for land to be shown by express agreement. Evans Est.,
2 Ash. (Pa.) 420; Slaymaker v. St. John, 5 Watts, 27; 11 Pa. 503;
Lynch v. Cox, 23 Pa. 265. In a resulting trust there is always the
element, altho it is not an implied one, of an intention to create a
trust, by reason of which, altho it is by no means an express trust,
it approaches more nearly thereto. In a resulting trust intention
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is an essential element, altho that intention is never expressed by
words of direct creation, the law presumes the intent from the facts
and circumstances accompanying the transaction. 39 Cyc. 27. According -to the intent of the parties and to the facts proven by
Sarah, there was a resulting trust created between Sarah and John
Collins.
But in this case the purchase money was not paid by Sarah but she
only paid a part of the consideration, and the question naturally arises
whether there can be a resulting trust where only a part of the
consideration money is paid? Where a conveyance is made in the
name of one person and a part of the consideration is paid by anChadwick v.
other, a trust results in the latter's favor protanto.
Felt, 35 Pa. 305; Ackley v. Ackley, 1 Pa. Cas. 138, 3 At. 434; Morey
v. Herrick, 18 Pa. 123; Work v. Work, 14 Pa. 316; Williard v. Willlard, 56 Pa. 119.
If, under the circumstances, the defendant had purchased the
property prior to the passage of the Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 425,
he would have acquired nothing at the sheriff's sale. As a judgment
creditor of John Collins, he would have had no lien on the land, even
though the recorded title was in him, for the real ownership was in
Sarah Collins. Until the Act of 1901 was passed a judgment was a
lien only upon lands actually owned by John Collins and against it
a secret or resulting trust and an unrecorded title could prevail.
Sill v. Swackhammer, 103 Pa. 7. Such trusts and titles were, however, unavailing against judgment creditors of the holder of the
recorded title, or purchasers from him, without actual or constructive notice that he was not the real owner of the land. This was
the situation when the act of June 4, 1901, was passed, and the question is as to the change it made. It is entitled "An act regulating
trusts arising from the payment of the purchase money of land by
one person, and the taking of the legal title in the name of another;" and its first section is as follows: "Whenever hereafter a
resulting trust shall arise with respect to real property, by reason
of the payment of the purchase money by one person, and the taking
or making of the legal title in the name of another, if the person advancing the purchase money has capacity to contract, such resulting trusts shall be void and of none effect as to bona fide judgment
or other creditors, or mortgagees of the holder of the legal title, or
purchasers from such holder without notice, unless either (1) a
declaration of trust in writing has been executed and acknowledged
by the holder of the legal title, and recorded in the recorder's office of the county where the land is situated, or (2) unless an action
of ejectment has been begun in the proper county, by the person advancing the money against the holder of the legal title."
This is a remedial act, passed to protect bona fide creditors
from an injustice to which they were subjected before the Act of
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1901. Prior to the act of 1901, one having lent money to another
upc.n a judgment taken on the faith of a clear recorded title to land
in the borrower would have found his judgment worthless as a lien,
if after its entry, he should have been confronted with a secret or
unrecorded declaration trust or deed by his debtor to another, of
which he had no knowledge; actual or constructive, at the time he
lent his money. An unknown cestui que trust might have locked in
his safe or carried around in his pocket a declaration of trust and
made use of it to sweep the land away from judgment creditors
only after the apparent owner of it had borrowed. The manifest
purpose of the Act of 1901 was to relieve bona fide judgment creditors from this injustice to which they had long been innocently subjected.
In the present case; Webb had no notice either actual or constructive of any kind of the trust in John Collins before his judgment was entered against him. The first notice to Webb that Sarah
Collins was part owner of the property by reason of the fact that she
paid $2125 of $4000, the consideration for the property, and that a
resulting trust existed as between her and her brother was before
the sheriff's sale; but this was after judgment had been obtainad,
execution issued and notice of the sheriff's sale had been given.
By the entry of his judgment note of record he had acquired whatever rights the Act of 1901 had given him, and notice to him thereafter was immaterial. A bona fide judgment creditor is one who, in
good faith, without fraud or collusion, recovers a judgment for
money honestly due him, and Webb is such a judgment creditor, entitled to protection by the Act of 1901 against a secret or resulting
trust set up by Sarah Collins. The legislature wisely concluded that
such protection was needed, and those against whom it is enforced
have no ground of complaint, in view of the very simple mode prescribed by the Act for their own protection. If they neither record the declaration of trust in their favor nor bring their actions
of ejectment on their equitable titles, they have only themselves to
blame when honest creditors acquire superior rights.
It was not the duty of the judgment creditor to inquire from
the person in possession or the man having the legal title to ascertain the real owner of it. This, in effect is that the judgment cred.
itor had constructive notice that the ownership was in another. If
non effect secret trusts of exactly the character of the one in this
the words "without notice" in the Act of 1901 apply to judgment
creditors, as well as to the mortgagees and purchasers, it seems
quite clear that the notice contemplated by the act is actual notice.
The object of the act of 1901 certainly was to make void and of
none effect secret trusts of exactly the character of the one in this
case. Judgment creditors must not make inquiry as to the real
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owner, as then the statute would not change the existing law and
was therefore useless legislation.
A case almost analogous to the present one is found in 243
Pa. 469. In that case, however, after the existence of a judgment
on record against the party holding the legal title for a number of
years, the party holding the equitable title filed a declaration of
trust a few weeks before the sheriff's sale and it was held that according to the act it was null and void and of none effect as to such a
bona fide judgment creditor.
Sarah Collins according to the act of 1901 should have recorded
a declaration of trust from her brother John, and if unable to secure
same, should have brought an action of ejectment against him, but
this should be done within a reasonable time after the purchase.
It was but a few hours work to file an action of ejectment which
she neglected and she cannot now recover against the purchaser at
the sheriff's sale. The act does not say how soon a declaration of
trust must be filed, or an action of ejectment commenced, but we
have every reason to believe that the legislature intended such action
to be commenced within a reasonable time after the property is
purchased. In this case, Sarah Collins waited too long to bring her
suit as it was brought against the purchaser at the sheriff's sale.
Judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
That Sarah Collins acquired the equitable ownership of 425
eight hundredths of the land, is not to be doubted. Gilchrist v.
Brown, 165 Pa. 275.
The act of June 4th, 1901, however has made the equity unenforcible against a judgment or other creditors unless a declaration
of trust by the owner of the legal title has been put on record before the
recovery of the judgment or unless before such recovery the owner of
the equity has brought an action of ejectment against the owner of the
legal title, for the purpose of enforcing the equity. Neither of these
acts has been done in this case. The conclusion of the learned court
below is fully vindicated by the language of the act of 1907, and the
interpretation of it found in Rochester Trust Co. v. White, 243 Pa.
469. Affirmed.

